
MSC BRIEFING

10 NOVEMBER 1955

## MOLOTOV AND GERMANY

- I. Bluntness of Molotov's 8 November statement latest reflection of immovable Soviet position on German reunification.
  - A. Basic Soviet view made clear at Summit; by Bulganin-German unity at this time impossible except through rapprochement of two Germanies.
  - B. Reflects also Moscow's conficence that time on Soviet side.
- II. Molotov was not trying to torpedo conference.
  - A. Good indication of this--his frantic resistance to Western efforts on 9 November of close off debate on agendation one and his hasty disclosure further items for discussion.
- other West Europeans that Western proposals unworkable and outdated by events of last

two years.



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- A. He hopes unequivocal rejection of
  Western plan may be followed by growing
  interest in compromise security plan
  based on divided Germany.
- Puture Soviet conference tactics will be designed to divert attention from German Stalemate
  - A. Molotov probably will introduce new security proposals, estensibly closer to those of West.
    - 1. For example, on 9 November he revived Bulganin's Summit proposal for nonaggression treaty between NATO and Warsaw Pact powers. Also proposed to cut in half four-power forces in Germany.
  - B. He probably will put forward compromise proposals on disarmament and East-West contacts.



Moscow is confident its rejection of Western proposals on Germany and European security will not jeopardize long-term. effects of "spirit of Geneva" posture.

- A. USSE anxious to maintain conference

  eystem, contacts with Newton leaders.

  Will stress positive results of

  conference; probably will propose

  another meeting next year.
- B. In meantime, Moscow prefers to maintain division of Germany from strategic viewpoint. Politically, it expects West German restiveness over failure to make progress toward unity will be focussed on Adenauer government and Western powers.